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Abstract 
This paper attempts to identify some of Neil MacCormick’s main contributions to 




Neil MacCormick, Institutionalism, Descriptive, Prescriptive 
MacCormick’s Institutionalism between Theoretical and Practical Reason 
Neil MacCormick’s untimely passing last spring has prompted an avalanche of tributes both 
to the man and to the theorist. The number, sincerity and the depth of sorrow expressed in 
those tributes bear witness to a life spent trying to further everyone’s understanding of law 
and politics, including his own. His legendary intellectual generosity poured out of himself in 
seminars and lectures, in his writings, and in his willingness to comment on everyone’s ideas. 
This attitude sprung from a deep-seated conception of academia as a collective effort carried 
out by means for different forms of interaction between seekers after the truth. His greatness 
as a theorist sprang from his potent theoretical voice; his greatness as a person prevented him 
from seeing that voice as, in any sense, special. But special it was.  
This paper attempts to identify some of Neil MacCormick’s main contributions to the 
contemporary debate in legal theory and to locate his efforts in legal theory’s own “history of 
ideas”. I have no hopes of being thorough. MacCormick has written about most aspects of 
moral, legal and political theory, ranging from proposing innovative interpretations of Adam 
Smith and Herbert Hart, to the foundations of private property and torts law; from 
sovereignty to legal reasoning; from the philosophical conception of institutions to the notion 
of the rule of law. Instead of attempting to present a comprehensive view of his contribution 
to legal theory, I shall focus in what follows on the field to which he contributed more 
systematically for more than three decades, to wit: the relation of legal reasoning, legal 
theory and politics.  
An appropriate account of MacCormick’s conception of legal reasoning and of its 
connections to legal and political theory supposes an understanding of the theoretical 
environment in which this understanding was formed. In his Legal Reasoning and Legal 
Theory, MacCormick seeks to offer a solution for what many consider to be an intrinsic 
insufficiency of legal positivism. The attempt to tackle that shortcoming of positivism, even 
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if carried out in a spirit not entirely inimical to positivism, has progressively distanced 
MacCormick from his positivist forbearers and contemporaries. A good way to understand 
that trajectory is to start by identifying this alleged insufficiency of positivism. And that 
alleged deficiency is better perceived in the canonical presentations of epistemic positivism 
by Kelsen and Hart. Simply put, that deficiency, which is apparent in both Kelsen’s Pure 
Theory and Hart’s analytical positivism is that epistemic positivism offers very little help to 
the legal decision-maker or, more broadly, to the practitioner. Neither has it offered the 
secure basis for a legal methodology or for a theory of legal argumentation.  
The very sparing comments on methodology made by Kelsen in chapter 8 of the 
second German edition of the Pure Theory, are clearly attempts to detach theories of legal 
interpretation from positive law. In the standard interpretation, these remarks state that each 
legal norm establishes a frame within which many different and competing interpretations are 
acceptable. However, the choice between those possible interpretations is not an act of 
cognition, but an act of will. In other words, a certain degree of interpretation (cognition of 
the positive law) might help to identify possible interpretations, but a choice between the 
possible interpretations is not guided by interpretation of the law, but (in relation to law) is to 
be understood as an act of will creating another norm. To use one of Kelsen’s favourite 
distinctions, the derivation is not static, but dynamic.  
This usual interpretation of chapter 8 would be enough to perceive the main message 
of a Kelsenian theory of interpretation: the will to create a norm, and not knowledge of the 
content of the superior norm, is the relevant element of legal “interpretation”. After all, 
Kelsen never tired of saying that law is a dynamic, not a static, normative system, where 
norms are created by the will, not by understanding. I would like to propose an even more 
radical interpretation. In one of the most overlooked passages of chapter 8, Kelsen states that: 
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“Here it is to be noted: By way of authentic interpretation (that is, 
interpretation of a norm by the law-applying organ) not only one of the 
possibilities may be realized that have been shown by the cognitive 
interpretation of the norm to be applied; but also a norm may be created 
which lies entirely outside the frame of the norm to be applied1”. 
I believe we should take this passage seriously. Kelsen is stating that the legal organ can 
actually create a new norm which goes beyond the “frame” given by the superior norm. But 
how could that be, if the superior norm is the only source of legal authority of the organ 
itself? Wouldn’t that imply a contradiction? I believe not. Kelsen’s Pure Theory is not 
conceived by him as part of practical reason. He is trying to present a theory of how to 
construct a truly scientific explanation of certain aspects of the world2 and, as such, the 
explanations of the legal scientist are always going to be ex post facto. There are certain 
observable acts of violence performed by certain people against other people. Those acts 
could be understood causally (from the point of view of, say, sociology, or neurology, or 
perhaps even physics), or they can be understood as “due” (from the point of view of 
imputation). An exposition of Brazilian law, Italian law or Scots law is an explanation of 
those acts of violence that already happened in the same way that an explanation of a 
particular kind of cell by biology supposes the existence of that cell.  
Now, acts of violence are, of course, highly contingent. If courts start ordering acts of 
violence (i.e. issuing norms) outwith the scope of the superior legal norm on which the 
scientist sees the ultimate ground for their authority, it just so happens that the fundamental 
norm postulated by the legal scientist as the ultimate imputative ground for the act of 
violence performed is not an adequate explanation for the acts of violence of those particular 
                                                 
1 Kelsen, H (1967) Pure Theory of Law (Berkeley, University of California Press), 354 
2 In Kelsen’s own understanding, an explanation of physical facts, as one can see in Pure Theory of Law, ibid, 1-
2. 
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people (the system’s officials) against others (those subject to them). That is why, from the 
point of view of the pure theory of law, courts (and indeed legal officials, without the 
sanctioning of courts) can act outside the frame provided by the norm. The frame is a 
scientific explanation of certain facts in the world, not a guide for action. It refers to the past, 
not to the future.  
Incidentally, that is the key to interpret Kelsen’s puzzling statement that efficiency is 
not a condictio per quam, but simply a condictio sine qua non in relation to the Grundnorm 
(and, consequently, to the whole legal system). I confess that for years this passage sounded 
to me like an unwelcome concession that Kelsen had to make in order to limit the scope of 
freedom of the scientist who postulates the fundamental norm (otherwise, what would stop 
the scientist from postulating that, say, the will of his mother is to be taken as the 
fundamental norm). If it were so, this would be indeed an unwelcome concession to tarnish 
an otherwise coherent and structured explanation. But, from what was said above, the role of 
efficiency can be seen in a very different light. The reason why efficiency is a condictio sine 
qua non, is that any Grundnorm is postulated in order to explain a certain number of acts of 
violence that actually occurred in society. If law is the explanation of those acts of violence, 
the postulation of the Grundnorm by a scientist that did not help explain (imputatively, not 
causally) those acts of violence would not so much be wrong, as it would be pointless. It 
would be an explanation about nothing. To put it briefly: for Kelsen, law is not the 
explanandum, but the explanation.  
It is a matter of course that, from the point of view of a theory of democracy, or some 
other political theory or belief, it might be a good thing that judges work within the frame 
posed by the norm, as identified by the scientist. It might help to control power, or to provide 
legal predictability, etc. In fact, Kelsen himself seems to have favoured this, from a political 
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point of view. However, Kelsen’s conception of a legal science obviously is not about that: it 
is not practical, but simply theoretical.  
If I am correct in the interpretation just sketched, it is fair to say that the absence of a 
methodology of legal reasoning in the pure theory is not a gap. Indeed, such methodology 
would be a conceptual impossibility for such kind of theory.  
Hart, on the contrary, tried to provide a sketchy account of legal reasoning. As any 
self-respecting legal theorist would know, this was the main objective of chapter 7 of The 
Concept of Law. The most well known feature of that chapter is the distinction between core 
and penumbra of meaning in legal rules, but elsewhere there are other interesting directives 
as to what to do in the penumbra of meaning. Hart believes that, even in the penumbra, 
judges are not to behave arbitrarily, but are to be guided by certain parameters, which are 
specifically judicial (although not legal). This is very clear in the following passage of 
chapter 8: 
At this point [i.e. judicial decisions that involves choice between moral 
values] judges may again make a choice which is neither arbitrary nor 
mechanical; and here often display characteristic judicial virtues, the special 
appropriateness of which to legal decision explains why some fell reluctant 
to call such judicial activity ‘legislative’. These virtues are: impartiality and 
neutrality in surveying alternatives; consideration for the interest of all who 
will be affected; and a concern to deploy some acceptable general principle 
as a reasoned basis for decision3.  
I do not which to enter the discussion here as to whether those judicial virtues would imply 
that Hart’s description of the legal system as a practice is inherently incomplete, because it 
fails to take into consideration the need to provide a legal explanation of that important 
                                                 
3 Hart, H (1994) The Concept of Law (2nd ed. Oxford, OUP), 205 
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aspect of the practice. What I want to emphasize is simply that, Hart’s positivism does not 
offer a methodology of judicial decision-making, even though he discusses certain aspects of 
that methodology.  
It seems to be safe to conclude then, that the canonical presentations of epistemic 
positivism available in the late 1960’s and early 1970’s did not offer a articulated account of 
legal reasoning that would be both descriptively accurate (in relation to what legal 
practitioners actually do)  and compatible with epistemic positivism. That is a larger problem 
than it might seem at first sight, in particular for Hartian positivists: if legal positivism is an 
appropriate explanation of a social practice and that practice is a practice that necessarily 
involves courts and legislatures (i.e. institutions directly connected to secondary rules), it 
follows that not paying attention to the actual practices of reasoning in court might make your 
explanation at best incomplete, but potentially wrong (in the same way that giving an account 
of a whole orange fundamentally based on observation of its outside might lead one to 
conclude that the orange has no seeds).  
That is precisely the kind of challenge raised by Dworkin and others: if one pays 
appropriate attention to how cases are argued (i.e. how the law is interpreted) there is much 
more at stake than simply the union of primary and secondary rules, each of which is 
linguistically formulated and has a meaning divided into core and penumbra. Other kinds of 
arguments that try to make sense of the system as a coherent whole must be taken into 
consideration.  
Approximately at the same time that Dworkin was developing his own critique to  
Hart’s positivism, Neil MacCormick started developing an account of legal reasoning that 
could be both descriptively acceptable in relation to argumentative practice in court and 
compatible with a conception of law that was broadly Hartian. This account would walk the 
fine line between vindicating certain general epistemic positivist insights on legal 
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interpretation (e.g. about the distinction between core and penumbra of meaning) and 
explaining how judges do not run completely out of law when they move into the penumbra 
of meaning.  
Both MacCormick’s Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory  and Dworkin’s Is law a 
system of rules? start by assuming the relevance of giving a legal answer to a question that 
both Hart and Kelsen relegated to the domain of the non-legal, to wit: how judges decide hard 
cases? The solution of those cases is part of legal practice and, as a consequence, no theory of 
law should get away with not explaining it properly.  
The starting point of MacCormick’s theory of legal reasoning is the identification of 
its function, to wit: the function of justifying an action. So legal reasoning is not simply about 
persuasion. While persuasion is oriented at a specific subject or group and admits of a wealth 
of methods that aim at influencing the opinions of that subject or group, legal reasoning is 
about providing an objective justification for action. 
Now, there are many argumentative strategies that might work as justifications. The 
most elementary justificatory argumentative form is deductive reasoning. By the time in 
which MacCormick was writing Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory, the use of deductive 
arguments by lawyers had been subject to decades of fierce critique. So MacCormick’s first 
worry in the book is to defend its use as both a good description of what judges do in many 
(if not most) cases and as a necessary (though not sufficient) feature of legal justification.  
Obviously that MacCormick is was not defending a return to the ways of the École de 
l’Exégèse, but a vindication of the usefulness of deductive argument against the critics that, 
in MacCormick’s understanding, went too far in dismissing deduction altogether. 
Nevertheless, he is deeply aware of its limitations when applied to legal contexts. First and 
foremost, there is the problem regarding the choice of premises to be locked together in a 
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deduction (or series of deductions). In Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory MacCormick 
focuses primarily on the challenge of finding the appropriate normative premise(s) of the 
legal syllogism, but in later work he will also try and explain the criteria we use to select our 
minor premises4. It is clear to him that law is not always clear and that it might harbour 
apparent contradictions and gaps, all of which would demand more rational resources than 
deductive argument can furnish.  
Which, then, are the legal premises from which we should start our deductive 
argument? An epistemological positivist, as far as he would be interested in giving this 
question an answer (and, as I said before, it is not entirely clear whether they should 
necessarily have any interest in this), would have to say that normative legal premises are 
those that best explain the behaviour of the legal officials. I do not want in this context to get 
tangled up in the endless debate about who counts as officials, or about whether the attitude 
of acceptance by the population of those official acts is also part of what is been described, or 
about which precisely are those acts (decision-making according to certain standards, acts of 
physical violence, or the threat of it, etc).  What is important is to perceive that this way to 
conceive the major premise sees it as a description of certain facts5.  
That is apparent when positivists are asked to explain what a legal justification might 
possibly be. They are often pushed to say something along the lines that “legal justification” 
means something entirely different from what is meant by the normal use of “justification” in 
practical reason. And indeed, words like “duty” and “obligation”, when applied to legal 
contexts, are descriptive rather then prescriptive concepts (or, as Kelsen would have it, are 
prescriptive but have no ultimate claim to guide behaviour). In other words, having a legal 
                                                 
4 For instance, and paradigmatically, in MacCormick, N Rhetoric and the Rule of Law (Oxford, OUP, 2005), 
chapter 11. 
5 By calling it a “description”, I am admittedly pushing it a bit, as far as Kelsen’s Pure Theory is concerned. 
Norms, in accordance with the account of Kelsen’s theory put forward above, are imputative explanations, 
rather than simple descriptions, but I venture to say that they are both kinds of explanation are, in a more 
abstract sense, descriptive.  
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obligation or a legal duty does not mean that I have to act in a particular way, unless we push 
the dissociation to say that legally I have to act in a particular way. But one can only push the 
dissociation thus far, since at the end of the day my action is only one and the ultimate 
question would of course be not whether I should do something  from a particular point of 
view (law, etiquette, etc), but whether I should do something tout court. 
MacCormick believes that this exclusion of the prescriptive, of the element of 
practical reason, from legal theory is a mistake. For him, both legal theory and legal 
reasoning must be based in a general theory of practical reasoning6. Law is, after all, an 
institutional normative order7, and not simply a way to describe certain facts (or a set of 
prescriptions that do not have, in themselves, a clear claim n future behaviour). His insistence 
that law be understood in the context of general practical reason (i.e. as having a direct, 
although not final, bearing on action) is the reason, put at its most abstract, why MacCormick 
considered himself to be a “post-positivist”. That does not mean that MacCormick did not 
assign an ontological place for law in a description of the world. Indeed his institutional 
theory of law is precisely an attempt at justifying the thesis that legal objects (rules, groups of 
rules, etc) should belong to any acceptable ontology. It is a fundamental metaphysical 
question about the kinds of being that there is and his main source here is the distinction 
between brute and institutional facts put forwards by the likes of E. Anscombe and J. Searle. 
MacCormick never ceased to believe on that metaphysical conception that accepts the 
existence of not only physical facts, but also institutional facts. However, law, as an 
institutional normative order that can be described as existing in the world, gains its meaning 
from a general theory of practical reason (more on that bellow). 
Let us go back to the limitations of purely deductive arguments. It is not only the case 
that we would not know for sure the status of our major premise (if it is simply a description 
                                                 
6 MacCormick, N Legal Reasoning and Legal Theory (2nd ed. Oxford: OUP, 1994), 265 
7 MacCormick, N Institutions of Law (Oxford: OUP, 2007), 11 ff 
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of a complex social fact or else a norm with practical punch). The major premise is often 
difficult to ascertain because the legal sources from which we derive them are not entirely 
clear. They are, for instance, expressed in natural language (which is inherently open 
textured, as Hart has argued); also legal sources are complex and their interplay itself, might 
give rise to competing interpretations. However it may be, it is clear that other argumentative 
strategies are called for. Here MacCormick elaborates on Hart’s insight that there are 
specifically judicial “virtues”, with the twist that, for MacCormick, the argumentative 
strategies derived from those judicial “virtues” are integral to a description of law. If law’s 
foundation is, ultimately, practical reason, it follows that those argumentative strategies that 
help judges use the law to orient action cannot be lightly dismissed as non-legal. There is no 
need here to go into any detail on the legal argumentative strategies identified by the Scottish 
philosopher, which include arguments from coherence8, arguments of consistency, a qualified 
form of consequentialist argument and arguments that help the legal decision-maker to cope 
with the particularity of the case, without being blinded by universal legal propositions, 
among others. What is important is to acknowledge the importance, both descriptive and 
prescriptive, attached by MacCormick to those arguments.  
Those arguments form what MacCormick dubbed second order justification. First 
order justifications are effectively the syllogistic inference that makes the backbone of legal 
arguments connecting some universal premise about the law with some particular premise 
about facts (and allowing for very complex degrees of interconnection).  A second order 
justification is a justification of the premises used in the syllogism(s) and that is not itself 
simply another syllogism. It might need inductive or analogical forms of argument (as it 
happens in arguments based on coherence), or it might take the form of a test of 
                                                 
8 Both normative, in which case he is referring to something similar to what means by “integrity” (cf. Legal 
Reasoning and Legal Theory, chapter 7, 152 ff; also Rhetoric and the Rule of law, chapter 10, 189 ff), and 
narrative, in which case he is referring to canonical arguments to identify the minor premise in the legal 
syllogism (Rhetoric and the Rule of law, chapter 11, 214 ff) 
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universilizability, which itself might be conceived in many different ways which are not 
reducible to a syllogism, or it might combine different kinds of arguments, and so on.  
But external justification is still legal justification, and it is so in two related ways. 
Firstly, they are legal in the sense that no description of the nuts and bolts of the legal system 
would do without giving them pride of place. If a theory of law brushes those forms of 
arguments aside by referring to them as merely moral, it is bound to be (at best) an 
incomplete theory of law. The legal theorist should not underestimate the centrality of legal 
reasoning to the phenomenon of law. Secondly, they are arguments about sources of law 
which are institutionally created, that is to say, they apply to law that is created by certain 
acts of certain agents in certain contexts. The law to which those arguments apply is 
primarily created. The best way to understand MacCormick’s particular take on law as 
practical reason would be to see it as an attempt at providing a middle way between 
Dworkin’s ultra rationalism and the exaggerated voluntarism of most epistemic positivists. 
The former tends to obscure the fact that law is an institution, that is to say, is created by 
contingent social decisions by social actors and the community at large. The latter is blind to 
the fact that law can only derive its sense from a broader conception of practical reason (and, 
consequently, legal decision-making can only be seen as part of rational decision-making). 
Between the Scylla and Charybdis of ultra rationalism and voluntarism stands MacCormick 
institutional theory of law.  
Remember that, according to MacCormick, law should be understood as an 
institutional normative order. While its institutional nature would differentiate law from 
general morality and general practical reason, its normative nature would differentiate law 
from the raw reality of politics and social fact. Now there are a number of distinct 
conceptions of what counts as an institution. The most relevant to understand MacCormick’s 
ontology is the philosophical sense that MacCormick derives from E. Anscombe and J. 
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Searle. Constructing his theory on that canon, MacCormick conceives an institution as a set 
of rules that determine the creation of an instance of the institution (institutive rules), 
establish the consequences of the creation of that institution (consequential rules) and the 
disappearance of a particular instance of the institution (terminative rules)9. What results 
from that is an anti-reductivist metaphysics that resonates with Weber’s comprehensive 
sociology, Peter Winch’s idea of social science and Hart’s conception of law10. Institutions 
are real entities and not simply subjective appropriations of the physical reality. Although 
they might be dependent on aspects of physical reality11, they exist as separate beings to that 
physical reality. 
To say that law is institutional means to accept the reality of legal sources (and, more 
abstractly, norms) as objects. Moreover, those are objects created whose existence is 
contingent on the incidence of institutive and terminative rules. But they are created as 
elements that a particular community institutes in order to bear on the practical reason of its 
members (and officials). So they are, at the same time, objects that can be described with an 
appropriate level of detail and abstraction (paradigmatically in legal doctrine), but which 
should also be incorporated into practical reasoning by the appropriate social players (and, 
ultimately, by the whole citizenry). That is the way in which MacCormick attempts to explain 
how law can be understood descriptively (as Hart famously set out to do in the preface of The 
Concept of Law) and prescriptively (as an integral part of practical reason).  
                                                 
9 Among other places, see MacCormick, N. and Weinberger, O.  An Institutional Theory of Law  (Dordrecht, 
Kluwer, 1986), 52-3 
10 A similar explanation of MacCormick’s anti-reductivism is to be found in La Torre, M (2009) Institutional 
theories and Institutions of Law: On Neil MacCormick’s Savoury Blend of Legal Institutionalism In Del Mar, 
M. and Bankowski, Z. (eds) Law as Institutional Normative Order (Ashgate), 71. I have dealt with the anti-
reductivism that underlies the projects of both MacCormick and Hart and tried to provide the metaphysical 
underpinning of this position in contrast to the physicalism of other positivists in Michelon, C (2004) Aceitação 
e Objetividade (São Paulo: RT),  passim 
11 According to Weinberger, for instance, they must exist in time. See MacCormick, N. and Weinberger, O.  An 
Institutional Theory of Law, 38. 
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As I said in the introduction to this short contribution, I did not set out to provide a 
complete account of the impact of Neil MacCormick’s vast published production. I have said 
nothing about his views on civil liberties, on the relationship between economy and law, on 
the political doctrine of nationalism, on the concept of sovereignty, on the legal-institutional 
structure of the European Union, on the foundations of private law institutions, among many 
other subjects dear to him. I deliberately refrained from engagement with some to the issues 
raised by MacCormick in order to provide a clearer picture of what I believe to be the place 
of some central aspects of his conception of law in the history of ideas and, in particular, the 
history of legal theory in the last century.  
It was a joy and an honour to have worked with him and it is frustrating that I cannot 
fully express that within the canon of respectable academic writing. However, my frustration 
would be partially appeased if this article prompts some legal theorists to acquaint (or 
reacquaint) themselves with Neil MacCormick’s rich contribution to the field. 
Edinburgh, autumn 2009 
 
